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ANTI-MALARIAL POLICY IN THE MADRAS
PRESIDENCY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EARLY
DECADES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
by
V. R. MURALEEDHARAN and D. VEERARAGHAVAN *
The history ofhealth care in colonial India was for long a neglected field ofstudy.
However, in recent years interest in the history of medicine and its role during the
period of British rule has been growing, as is evident from the increasing number of
studies published.' Whilesomeattemptshavebeenmadeto drawthebroadoutlinesof
thedevelopment ofhealth policy at both an all-India level2 and at regional levels,3 the
policies onspecific diseaseshavereceived farlessattention.4Thisisparticularlytrueof
malaria. Thereisasyetnodetailedhistoryofanti-malarial measuresincolonialIndia.5
Our desire to fill this gap in the existing literature on the history ofhealth care is the
basic motive for this paper, which attempts to trace the various anti-malarial steps
taken by the governmentofMadras during theearly decades ofthe twentiethcentury.
We begin with a briefbackground to the nature ofhealth care policy in the Madras
Presidency andasummaryofthedebate on thenatureofanti-malarial measures taken
in the years following the discovery of the anopheles mosquito. We then focus our
* Both Dr V. R. Muraleedharan and Dr D. Veeraraghavan are faculty members in the Department of
Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras (India), PIN: 600 036.
We sincerely thank the referees for their valuable comments on this paper. We are however responsible for
any errors that may remain.
I The following two books are the most recent additions to the existing literature: David Arnold (ed.),
Imperial medicine and indigenous societies, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1989; and Poonam Bala,
Imperial medicine and Bengal, 1850-1947, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1991.
2 Radhika Ramasubban, Public health and medical research in India: their origins under the impact of
British colonialpolicy, Stockholm, 1982.
3 J. C. Hume Jr., 'Colonialism and sanitary medicine: the development ofpreventive health policy in the
Punjab, 1860 to 1900', Mod. Asian Stud., 1986, 20: 703-24. There are also twounpublished theses onpublic
health administration in the Madras Presidency: Christopher J. Nirmal, 'A study ofpublic health in the
Madras Presidency, 1882-1912', Ph.D. thesis, University of Madras, 1970; and J. L. Yesudasan, 'Public
health (sanitary) administration in the Madras Presidency, 1922-1942', M.Litt. thesis, University of
Madras, 1949.
4 This gap is being filled to some extent, see Arnold, op. cit., note 1 above.
S Mention however should be made ofthe following three studies that have dealt with malaria in some
detail: Ira Klien, 'Malaria and mortality in Bengal, 1840-1921', Indian econ. andsocial Hist. Rev., 1972, 9:
132-60; Elizabeth Whitcombe, 'Irrigation', in Dharma Kumar (ed.), The Cambridge economic history of
India, vol. 2, New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1983, pp. 637-737; and V. R. Muraleedharan, 'Malady in
Madras: the colonial government's response to malaria in the early twentieth century', in Deepak Kumar
(ed.), Science and empire: essays in Indian context, New Delhi, Anamika, 1991, pp. 101 12.
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attention on the efforts made to combat the disease between the two world wars.
Broadly speaking, the anti-malarial efforts ofthe government ofMadras entailed the
development of(a) aquininepolicyandasearchforalternativedrugs; and (b)effective
location-specific preventive measures based on a clear understanding of socio-
economicconditions. Wewilldealwitheachofthesepointsinturnandconcludewitha
summary of our observations.
Western medicine in colonial India was firmly established by the beginning ofthis
century. By then a fairly elaborate, but by no means adequate, administrative
machinery had been set up to look after the health of the people throughout the
country, the Madras Presidency included. The health care system in that state
underwent qualitative changes, especially during the inter-war years. In 1919, as a
result ofthe Government ofIndia Act, public healthadministration was transferred to
the Indian ministers of the provincial governments. This made it possible for the
Madras administration toexperimentwithcertaintacticstocombatdisease. Aseries of
legislative measures was introduced which show clear evidence of the provincial
government's influence on health care between the wars; the most important ofthese
were the Madras Medical Registration Act 1914, the Madras Prevention of
Adulteration Act 1918, the Madras Nurses and Midwives Act 1926, and the Madras
Public Health Act 1939.
Up tothemiddle oftheeighteenthcentury, European medicine, brought to Indiaby
the colonizers, served to protect the health of only the Army and the European
community. As Arnold has pointed out, in nineteenth-century colonial India, western
medicine "was constrained ideologically, financially and politically from broader and
moreeffectiveinvolvement in thehealthofthepopulation".6 Nonetheless,healthcare
slowly expanded,7 although the overall thrust of the system was biased towards
curativeservices, anditsufferedoftenfromlackoffunds. TheMadrasgovernmentwas
guided allalongbytheprinciple oflaissez-faire as faras thismatterwasconcerned and
so it sought for a means of developing a cheap method of health care whereby the
state's expenditure would be reduced, and the patients would meet the cost
themselves.8 Unfavourable economic conditions, such as the depression of 1929-32,
contributed to the Madras government's decision to rely increasingly on private
medical practitioners, alternatively called the Independent Medical Profession, to
provide health care to the mass of the population. This is evident ifone looks at the
history ofrural health care, particularly the Subsidised Rural Medical ReliefScheme,
in the MadrasPresidencyduringtheinter-waryears. When the schemewasintroduced
there was adiscussion about the way in which the provincial government should, over
6 David Arnold, 'Medical priorities and practice in nineteenth-century British India', S. Asia Res., 1985,
5: 167-83.
7 For a summary ofthe reasons that forced thecolonial government to extend health servicesbeyond the
needs ofthe Army and the European community, see Arnold, 'Introduction: disease, medicine andempire',
in Arnold, op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 1-26.
8 V. R. Muraleedharan, 'Developmentofhealth caresystem intheMadrasPresidency, 1919-1939', Ph.D.
thesis, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, 1988.
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a period of time, phase itself out of supporting the health services, leaving their
administration to be taken over ultimately by private medical practitioners. This
reflected a laissez-faire attitude in a larger sense. Medical reliefwas essentially treated
as a local affair by the provincial government and therefore it gave local bodies very
little financial assistance.9 Given the nature ofthe Madras government's policy, it is
important to know how it responded to certain widely prevalent communicable
diseases. The history of this aspect of health care offers an insight into the nexus of
various forces that determined the nature, timing and effectiveness of the
administration's response. This can best be illustrated through an account of the
various efforts made by the Government ofIndia to combat malaria, the disease that
was perhaps most feared. It was considered by the British to be "a problem of
Imperial Magnitude"'10 and one ofthe principal menaces to British life and health in
the empire. The social and economic costs to India were estimated to be enormous, as
the following comment made in 1934 byJ. A. Sinton, a pioneer in malarial research in
India, reveals:
Malaria gives rise to the greatest economic problem with which India is faced. The
financial losses to the individual and the family alone have been calculated at not less
than Rs. 11,000 lakhs annually, or about 80 million sterling per annum. This apart
from the effects ofthe disease upon all aspects ofthe labour problem, and thus upon
the fullest exploitation of the natural resources of the country and the successful
development of her manufacturing and other industries. While it is not possible to
evaluate with any degree ofaccuracy the immensity ofthese direct and indirect losses,
there is little reason to doubt that they must run into unbelievable millions ofpounds
of sterling each year."
The discovery by Ronald Ross in 1898 that malaria was carried by the anopheles
mosquito was ranked "not only as the greatest ofIndia's medical triumphs, but as one
ofthe greatest discoveries ofmodern times".12 It was now possible to think ofmore
coherent preventive measures. The fact that the transmission ofthe disease could be
interrupted by destroying the vector also made it practicable for tropical sanitarians
to make more accurate studies ofthe habits and breeding places ofdifferent species of
anopheles.
Malarial fever was as prevalent in the Madras Presidency as it was in other parts of
colonial India. The city of Madras and its surroundings profited from the early
anti-malarial measures despite the fact that they suffered less from malarial fever than
the other parts of the Presidency. The reason for this could be that the city had a
higher proportion of Europeans than the rest of the State. Unlike the plague which
9 V. R. Muraleedharan, 'Rural health care in Madras Presidency: 1919-1939', Indian econ. and social
Hist. Rev., 1987, 24: 323-34.
10 That was how Lord Minto, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, characterized malaria in his
inaugural address of the Imperial Conference, 12-18 October 1909, held at Simla, Government of India,
Proceedings ofthe Imperial Conference on Malaria, Simla, 1910.
ll J. A. Sinton, 'What malaria cost India, nationally, socially, and economically (concluded)', Records of
Malaria Survey ofIndia (hereafter, RMSI), 1936, 6: 91-169.
12 R. McCarrison, 'India and medical progress', Br. med. J., 1917, ii: 110.
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was concentrated in urban areas where the most intensive preventive operations were
carried out,13 malaria was more severe in the countryside where, by comparison with
the towns, few anti-malarial measures were taken.
In the years following Ross's discovery a series ofdiscussions took place amongst
the policy makers in the Madras government about the feasibility of applying
anti-malarial measures as suggested by Ross. We give below a brief account of that
discussion, before going on to the later period.
Late in 1901, Ronald Ross wrote from Liverpool to the Under Secretary of State
for India on the subject of"mosquito brigades for India" as a preventive measure
against malaria.14 Until then, the only method employed against the fever had been
the administration of quinine to infected persons. Ronald Ross believed that the
elimination ofmalaria depended on the destruction ofthe mosquitoes rather than on
massive use of quinine. From his experiments in Sierra Leone in Africa, he felt that
mosquito brigades were the best means available to eliminate the insects, and he
therefore suggested that they be tried out in India as well. His conception of a
"mosquito brigade" can best be described in his own words:
The local health officer or district medical officer, or other persons interested in the
subject, should at once engage the services ofan intelligent headman and a sufficient
staff of workmen, who will constitute the brigade. These should be first instructed
how to find larvae ofmosquitoes in vessels ofwater in the vicinity ofhouses, in pools
of stagnant water on ground, in garden, cistern, drains and so on. Native agents
carefully selected will be found quite capable of learning the work.'5
He was convinced that these operations "are not so formidable as it may at first sight
appear"; for him their guiding principle was contained in three words: "No Stagnant
Water'6 Ross was also opposed to starting operations over too large an area.
Instead, hesuggested that "it is best to begin in theimmediate vicinity ofthe houses of
Europeans..".'7 From such a beginning, he thought, the operations would take
shape as they evolved. He was certain that as soon as the neighbouring breeding
places were carefully removed "the winged insects will vanish as if by magic",.'8
These suggestions were communicated to the various provincial governments by
the Government of India. While briefing them on the subject of mosquito brigades,
W. S. Marris, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Home (Medical)
Department, observed that "it is highly desirable that a knowledge of the now
accepted fact that measures such as those desired by Major Ross to a great extent
ensure immunity from malarial fevers should be widely disseminated among the
13 David Arnold, 'Touching the body: perspective on the Indian plague, 1896-1900', in Ranajit Guha
(ed.), Subaltern studies, vol. v, Writings on south Asian history andsociety, New Delhi, Oxford University
Press, 1987, pp. 55-90.
14Tamil Nadu Archives, Madras (hereafter TNA), Ronald Ross, 'Mosquito brigade for India', in
Government Order (hereafter GO) 33 (Public Department, hereafter Public), 9 February 1902.
1' Ibid.
16 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
Ibid.
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population".'9 But he also clearly advised that the "sphere of operations must be
restricted by practical considerations". Marris felt that a "beginning must be made
gradually, and that ... to secure systematic and thorough operations in a few selected
places would be better than to attempt to deal with areas too extended". He feared
that if it were tried in many places and did not succeed, "it would bring the remedy
into disrepute; whereas definite success in a few places might bring home to the people
the ease with which they could secure comparative immunity from malarial fevers".
The government ofMadras was asked to use its discretion in deciding to what extent
and in what areas action should be taken and was asked to report to the Government
of India any success attained by measures of the kind which Ross advocated.
But it was not possible for the Madras government to experiment with the
mosquito brigades because the idea was not welcomed enthusiastically by all the
health officials concerned. By the end of 1902, the Surgeon-General with the
government ofMadras, S. D. Sinclair, received reports from 49 health officials in the
Presidency on the use of mosquito brigades along with several different options.20
While some officials were eager to experiment with the brigades but felt constrained
by lack of financial resources, others argued that "so long as wet cultivation in and
around towns and villages is permitted, so long as wells, swamps, huge ravines,
ponds, tanks etc., allowed to exist, mosquito brigade operations would be
comparatively useless and the results might bring the remedy intodisrepute"..2' As for
the city ofMadras, a small brigade was appointed on an experimental basis to cover
some parts ofthe city. But the health officer ofthe Madras Corporation was strongly
opposed to brigades being used in otherparts, as he considered that "it was not a very
suitable place for such operations". He felt that it was necessary to wait until the main
drainage system had been completed and the water supply improved, gradually
allowing wells to be closed, before the efforts of the mosquito brigades, tiny by
comparison, could be used with any hope ofsuccess in the municipality. Among the
foreseen difficulties, the most insurmountable appeared to be that of making wet
cultivation around villages or towns illegal. In fact, Sinclair argued that the
prohibition ofthe cultivation ofpaddy fields in malarious areas would involve such a
large expenditure as to be entirely impracticable.
Since the opinion ofthe health officers was divided, the government ofMadras was
faced with the question ofwhether ornot it wasworth spending money on thecrusade
against mosquitoes. What came out clearly was the realization that the cost-
effectiveness of the operations suggested by Ross would be low unless they were
undertaken simultaneously with a number of other measures as well, something
which was not possible or even practicable. As G. S. Forbes, Secretary to the Public
Department, reasoned: "it was a mistake to believe that there was no use in doing
19 Letter from W. S. Marris, Under Secretary to Government of India, Home (Medical) Department to
the ChiefSecretary to the Government ofMadras, 16 December 1901, in TNA, GO 33 (Public), 9 February
1902.
20 Letter from S. D. Sinclair (Surgeon-General) with the Government ofMadras to the ChiefSecretary to
the Government of Madras, 22 May 1902, in TNA, GO 1173 (Public), 19 November 1902.
21 Ibid.
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anything at all unless every piece of stagnant water was either treated or
obliterated... and there was no need to wait until big projects such as drainage
schemes were undertaken, or all wells closed or wet cultivation prohibited in malarial
zones . . .s.22 He left it however to the district boards or municipalities to select some
villages or portions of a town for experiment urging that "in the interest of science,
the measures advocated by Major Ronald Ross should be given a trial where
practicable".23
A series of mixed reactions from the various district boards and municipalities
followed. Twelve of the district boards and thirty-nine municipal councils made it
clear that they did not intend to take any action in the matter; while the rest were
eitherwilling tocarry outthe experiments orhad already started to do so.24Those not
willing to take any action gave a variety ofreasons. Some were very sceptical ofsuch
measures. For example, the district board ofGanjam passed a resolution that "in the
opinion of the board, the scheme is impracticable and would involve expenditure
without any corresponding advantage". Lack offunds was also cited by some boards
and municipalities. Curiously, many of the boards and councils even claimed that it
was unnecessary to take any action because malaria was not at all common in their
regions, despite evidence to the contrary.
Because ofthis division ofopinion, the government found it difficult to formulate
any concrete plan. This only meant further delay in adopting Ross's proposals even at
an experimental level.25 Clearly, one ofthe main problems in combating malaria was
the delay between the discovery of the aetiology of the disease and the practical
application of this knowledge. This is reflected in the following comment made in
1936 by G. G. Jolly while reviewing progress in medical research in India:
years ago the crying need was for knowledge of the mode of spread of our main
diseases such as malaria and plague. Today we still have a vast amount to learn, but
perhaps ourgreater roblem isthe successful application ofthe theoretical knowledge
we alreadypossess.R6
At the level of government policy, what followed was an increasing reliance on
palliative measures oftemporary value. Research on methods oftreatment, especially
with the use ofquinine and its substitutes, received greater attention in the following
decades.
II
The question of "cinchona policy" or, as it was alternatively called, the "quinine
policy", was plagued with many difficulties. There were a number of unanswered
questions, which revealed clearly where the gaps in knowledge lay, and the directions
22 Notes by G. S. Forbes, dated 28 October 1902, in TNA, GO 1173 (Public), 19 November 1902. 23 Ibid.
24 TNA, GO 1378 (Local), 30 October 1903.
25 For a detailed account ofthe discussion, see Muraleedharan, 'Malady in Madras', in Deepak Kumar,
op. cit., note 5 above.
26 G. G. Jolly, 'Medical research in India', Indian Medical Gazette (hereafter, IMG), 1936, 71: 42.
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in which further inquiries should be continued. The central questions were
essentially:27
(a) How do malarial parasites produce the symptoms of malaria?
(b) How does man overcome malarial infection?
(c) What is the best drug to use?; what is the best way of administering it?
To put it differently, these questions were concerned with the relationship between
host, vector, parasite and the environment. More research was required to provide the
answers which would lead to an understanding of malaria in relation to local
conditions including geographic, socio-economic and cultural factors. The
government of Madras had, by early 1930 at least, taken up the following position
concerning the drug to be used against malaria:
To hope that this [quinine] alone would banish malaria would be to court failure. It
does certainly cure an attack and does relieve suffering. Unfortunately, it cannot
prevent relapses, and it is now definitely shown that it is not a prophylactic either.
Quinine is at best an auxiliary to other and more permanent measures directed against
the destruction of anopheles mosquitoes and breeding places.28
None the less, the government felt that since "it would be impossible and
impracticable for financial and other reasons to adopt anti-mosquito measures,
quinine is bound to remain the only mainstay."29 The various studies conducted later
in the 1930s also indicated that quinine could not serve as a prophylactic measure but
would remain as the mainstay of all forms of treatment of malarial fevers.30
The high cost of quinine was also an important factor to be considered. The price
was considerably influenced by Java, which produced more than 95 per cent of the
total world output, thus enjoying a virtual monopoly of the market.3' However, the
Government of India retained the power to regulate the price and production of
quinine within India. By the early 1920s, the price was fixed at approximately Rs. 18
per pound, though the cost ofproduction in government-owned factories in Madras
was only Rs. 13.9 perpound, and in Bengal it was only Rs. 6.5 per pound.32 The reason
for the high price, the Government ofIndia argued, was that ifany attempt was made
to sell quinine in India at a price below that ofthe world market, Indian quinine would
immediately be bought up by agencies outside the country.33 This pricing policy was
27 There were many other unanswered questions of equal importance. For example, it was known that
various species of anopheles mosquitoes existed, and that each of them had a specific breeding site, some
preferring sluggish water, some running streams. "But there are a hundred and one facts which may
profoundly affect the breeding of mosquito larvae of different species. A slight change in the mineral
content ofwater may transform a breeding ground into one quite unsuitable for the larvae"; there was also
little knowledge "about the natural enemies ofmosquitoes, and even less about their natural diseases". see
'The future of malaria control in India' (editorial), IMG, 1927, 62: 27-32.
28 TNA, GO 786 (Public Health Department, hereafter P.H.), 8 April 1932. 29 Ibid.
30J. A. Sinton, 'A suggested standard treatment of malaria based upon the results of the controlled
investigation of over 3700 cases', IMG, 1930, 65: 603-20; and R. H. Chopra, 'The present position of
anti-malarial drug therapy in India', IMG 1938, 73: 418-23.
31 Henry Gidney, 'Quinine problem in India', Indian med. J., 1937, 31: 371-4.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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continued despite the fact that therewas a great need for the drug. One obvious result
wasthattheGovernmentmadeaprofit from thesales. Butit should also benoted that
because ofthe high price not all that was produced could be sold. The situation was
characterized by a very great need, but, at the same time, by a low level ofdemand. In
this context, the need for substitutes for quinine was felt all the more acutely. These
wereexpected tobeaseffectiveasquinineagainstmalariaand, atthesametime,tocost
less, so that the demand for anti-malarial drugs would increase. But it was not an easy
task to introduce the substitutes that existed onto the market.
There was first ofall the problem ofconvincing the medical profession ofthe value
of the substitutes. As one of the editorials of the Indian Medical Gazette in 1941
commented: "the demand for pure quinine originated with the medical professionals
and it was found difficult tochangetheirchoice ofdrug."34This was one ofthemajor
restrictions on evolving the best possible policy to combat malaria. In fact, some
alternatives to "pure quinine alkaloid" were available,35 although no one was certain
as to which and in what combinations they could be used effectively. By 1930, various
studies had already been done on the relative efficacy ofcinchona febrifuge, and of
individual alkaloids as substitutes for pure quinine.36 Reviewing the existing evidence
from various sources in 1931, J. A. Sinton made the following observation:
There seems to be few workers who dissent from the opinion that in medical doses
this drug is little inferior to quinine in the production of a clinical cure in ordinary
cases ofmalaria, indeed some consider it more efficacious. Although it has not been
confirmed that this drug is more efficacious in the production ofa permanent cure in
chronic benign tertian malaria, yet the evidence would seem to indicate that it is only
slightly inferior to quinine in the same doses in ordinary cases of both benign and
malignant tertian malaria.37
It was thought that by ajudicious selection ofstrains ofCinchona succiruba (a variety
of cinchona bark) it would be possible to minimize the toxic effects of cinchona
febrifuge.38 But the market was flooded with cinchona febrifuge with varying
proportions ofdifferent alkaloids.39 Although the combined effects ofthese mixtures
were appreciated by the medical community, they had no "standard" which they
could use for mass treatment. Therefore, in order to suggest a standard for cinchona
febrifuge (alternatively called "total-cinchona-alkaloids") the League of Nations'
special malaria commission surveyed the Indian sub-continent in 1929. The
commission suggested a standardized preparation known as totaquina.40 But the
34Quoted in 'The need for a cheap and efficient anti-malarial drug in India' (editorial), IMG, 1941, 76:
225-8.
35 For a detailed account of what constitutes cinchona bark, refer 'The Total Cinchona-Alkaloids'
(editorial), IMG, 1934, 69: 215-17.
36 J. A. Sinton, 'The relative values ofthe cinchona alkaloids in the treatment ofmalarial fevers', RMSI,
1931, 1: 451-72.
37 Ibid, p. 464.
38 Ibid, p. 465.
39 Ibid, pp. 465-9.
40 Themainadvantageofthisstandardized mixture ofalkaloid (totaquina) overothermixtures(cinchona
febrifuge) was that in the former "a minimum of 15% ofquinine" was present. For details see 'Cinchona
Policy' (editorial), IMG, 1932, 67: 393.
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problem was not just one of suggesting a standard preparation. Again, as already
noted, the medical profession was not yet ready to accept it. In 1931, an Indian
Medical Gazette editorial commented that "greater efforts must be made to educate
first of all the medical profession to accept the alternative to quinine".41 Besides, in
the case oftotaquina, its efficacy had yet to be demonstrated clinically under varying
Indian conditions.42
In 1934, J. A. Sinton again sought to dispel the general scepticism, especially
prevalent among medical men, about the effectiveness ofexisting substitutes for pure
quinine. He firmly believed that "a mixed alkaloid preparation of the nature of
totaquina would probably be little, if at all, less valuable than quinine for mass
treatment as carried out in the tropics."43 But there was no sign ofany change in the
demand for pure quinine by the medical profession during the 1930s.44 Apart from
the problem offinding substitutes for quinine alkaloid, the question ofdistribution of
these drugs in malarious regions continued to pose serious problems.45 Even as early
as 1909, Lt.-Col. Leslie, the Sanitary Commissioner with the government ofMadras,
lamented that "given an efficient organisation, some proportion ofthis suffering and
loss due to malaria is preventable by means already in power."46 In 1934, Sinton
echoed the same opinion: "the more urgent problems at the moment [that] confront
India in connection with the treatment of her large malarious population are more
closely allied with the provision of means of distribution of treatment to the
malarious areas of the country rather than the standardisation of cinchona
febrifuge 47
To summarize, we can say that as far as quinine policy in the Madras Presidency
was concerned, it was not only lack of knowledge of effective therapeutic measures
but equally the lack oforganised means ofdistribution that were responsible for the
failure to combat malaria.
III
Although complete eradication of the disease by drugs alone was accepted as
impossible, the value ofthe therapeutic approach in preventing many deaths from it
was recognized and appreciated by the medical community and the government. In
the last section, referring to some ofthe issues involved, we showed the limitations of
such an approach and of its benefits to the health of the people. The other method
involved devising preventive measures to suit the areas known for malaria. These had
to be planned "with due weightage being given to the physical and geographical
features, the social and economic status ofthe people and the financial stability ofthe
41 'The Quinine Policy', (editorial) IMG, 1931, 66: 522.
42 IMG, 1934, op. cit., note 35 above, p. 216.
43 J. A. Sinton, 'The standardisation ofmixed preparation ofthe cinchona alkaloids in relation to Indian
conditions', RMSI, 1934, 4: 5-13.
44 IMG, 1941, op. cit., note 34 above, p. 228.
45 TNA, GO 786 (P.H.), 8 April 1932.
46 J. T. W. Leslie, 'Aproposal forthefurtherinvestigation ofmalaria in India', (reprinted in) RMSI, 1931,
1: 92.
47 Sinton (March 1934), op. cit., note 43 above, p. 13.
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authorities concerned in each area investigated."48 Therefore preliminary in-depth
studies ofthose regions had to be carried out before any work could begin. The first
such study was undertaken in 1911 in Ennore (then a small village on the east coast,
about 12 miles north ofthe city ofMadras). Anti-malarial work based on the results
was carried out between 1911-1914. The outbreak ofwar in 1914 brought an abrupt
end to the schemes "although they were sufficiently advanced to bear fruitful
results".49 However, albeit in a spasmodic manner, anti-malarial operations in
Madras continued until 1927 when the government at the suggestion of Lt.-Col.
A. J. H. Russell, the Director of the Public Health Department, showed an interest
in formulating and starting up a new scheme for dealing with the problem ofmalaria
in the Presidency. Col. Russell urged that the government should undertake
"systematic and adequate investigation and research on malaria as a necessary step
towards the purely practical application of preventive measures."'50 As a result, the
government ofMadras appointed, in 1927, K. R. Rao as a special malaria officer with
a staffofone assistant surgeon, two laboratory assistants (and a clerk and a peon) to
investigate the malarial conditions in selected areas, and to advise the government
and the local bodies on the measures to be taken to eradicate the disease.51 While the
government accepted Col. Russell's proposals for surveys to be carried out over a
period oftwo years, it insisted that they should be confined to two or three localities
only, particularly to those municipalities well known for malaria. The government
was keen that preventive measures arising out of such work should be "within the
financial capacity ofthe government and ofthe local bodiesconcerned".52 As a result,
malaria surveys were undertaken from 1927 onwards beginning with Bellary town
and followed by others. But soon it was found that it was not "economically sound"
to restrict the scope ofthe work in the manner originally planned. The reasons for this
were given by the special malaria officer:
For one thing, recommendations and suggestions made for the suppression of
malaria for any one place could not, for obvious reasons, be brought to any material
form or shape until after the lapse of long time. For another thing, the local bodies
who were actually called upon to execute the proposed anti-malarial measures
pleaded incapacity on financial grounds. For a third thing still, even where a local
authority was willing to do its part, it had to await the solution ofconflicting interests
ofthe several authorities responsible for the area under question. Meanwhile, reports
ofoutbreaks ofmalaria and requisitions for carrying on investigations in other parts
came pouring in. The government have, therefore, had to relax their resolution of
restricting the work of investigation to two or three municipal areas as originally
framed, and to call upon the special malaria officer to take up the inquiry of the
malaria problem in other areas.53
48 K. R. Rao, 'Note on the present state of knowledge about malaria in the Presidency of Madras',
RMSI, 1931, 1: 483.
49 Ibid, p. 474.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. p. 475.
53 Ibid.
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By 1930, a malaria survey had been conducted in 40 areas in different parts ofthe
Presidency. Essentially, it consisted ofthe collection ofthe spleen and parasite rates in
those areas. Though it was too early to map out a full geographical distribution of
anophelines in the Presidency, the survey revealed certain important features about
the distribution ofmalaria: (a) that A. culicifacieswas the mostcommon carrier ofthe
disease; and (b) that malaria was "prevalent to a variable extent in almost all parts of
the Presidency at one part or the other".54 More importantly, the survey threw some
fresh light on the nature of malaria and its connection with irrigation channels and
wet cultivation in the inland parts of the state. As the special malaria officer put it:
The crux ofthe problem still is in the areas under smaller or bigger irrigation projects.
In a purely agricultural country like ours, where more than 95 per cent of the
population has to depend for their living on what they can grow on land, one could
only recommend the abolition of irrigation with great searching of heart. The
alternative measures for conserving the numerous irrigation channels in a cleanly
state, or for delimiting the areas under cultivation where feasible beyond the radius of
halfa mile ofthe village-site, are often put forward. But on account ofthe conflicting
interests of the several authorities concerned, no progress has been possible.55
He further added that the Revenue and the Public Works authorities should realize
"how necessary it is to ensure that the very facilities that are intended to give the ryot
his daily bread do not act as his 'death trap', as well".56
Malaria in Madras thus posed complex problems which were difficult to solve. Ad
hoc investigations and tinkering with the problem here and there would not bring
forth any fruitful results. This led the government to agree to establish a permanent
organization which would continue investigation and research into the problem and
evolve a systematic policy over a period of time. One could say that this was the
beginning of a series of important studies systematically carried out in South India
with the aim ofgaining a better understanding ofmalaria and ofevolving preventive
measures suited to local conditions. One such study started in 1936, was undertaken
in the Pattukkottai taluk in the Tanjore district by the Department of Public Health
in co-operation with the Rockefeller Foundation and the King Institute ofPreventive
Medicine (Guindy, Madras). This taluk was chosen for a detailed malaria survey
because it was suspected to have become malarious only after it had begun to receive
water from the Mettur-Cauvery irrigation project from 1933-34.57
What follows is a brief outline of these investigations on the nature ofmalaria in
the Pattukkottai taluk, conducted in the field. They took into account geographic
factors and local cultivation practices. This case study highlighted issues that the
government had to bear in mind while formulating anti-malaria policy in any region.
54 The survey collected details such as spleen rate, parasite rate, name of the species, nature of the
breeding ground, in 40 different parts of the Presidency. Ibid., pp. 486-97.
55 Ibid., p. 484. 56 Ibid., p. 485.
57 The Pattukkottai taluk in Tanjore district covered an area of433,500 acres, of which 26% was under
cultivation (1931 figures). The northern and eastern portions of Tanjore district formed the delta of the
Cauvery river.
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Because ofthe lack ofsimilar studies in other parts ofthe Presidency, only the results
gained from the Pattukkottai taluk are summarized here and we do not discuss the
question ofmalaria caused by the introduction ofirrigation facilities in other areas of
colonial India.58
The Pattukkottai taluk was not malarious until 1933.59 Before that time it was a
dry zone with groundnuts as the most important crop, but during that year the canal
system became operable so that it received water from about mid-June to the
following mid-February. No drainage canal was provided for the irrigation system in
the taluk or elsewhere, with the result that water accumulated in low-lying places.
Clearly, the introduction ofthe Mettur irrigation system caused a number ofchanges
in the taluk, some of the most important being:60
(a) Wet paddy cultivation increased, replacing the earlier chief crop, groundnuts;
the monetary value of the land also was enhanced;
(b) Wet weather streams carried more water and were dry for a shorter time than
previously;
(c) Tanks which used to dry up for several months each year, now were dry for a
shorter time;
(d) Low-lying fields became waterlogged as a result ofa rise in the sub-soil water
level; this offered more scope for farmers to dig many shallow wells for irrigation
during the off-season;
(e) Borrow pits, made for various reasons, and ditches, formerly dry most of the
year, became filled with waste irrigation water, and remained "full during the season,
and thereafter for varying periods".
All these changes were suspected to be the cause ofthe noted increase in the incidence
of malaria in the Pattukkottai taluk from 1934 onwards. Compared to 1933, the
proportion ofmalaria cases to the total number ofpatients treated in the government
hospital in Pattukkottai town increased 4 times in 1934, 15 times by 1935, and 10
times by 1936 and 1937.61
The malaria season in the Pattukkottai taluk lasted from July to January and the
off-season from February to June. It was observed that in Pattukkottai there were
certain specific ways in which irrigation facilitated the development of the malaria
carrying mosquitoes, A. culicifacies. As a result ofa preliminary study carried out in
Pattukkottai taluk between July 1936 and March 1938, Russell and his team
discovered an intimate association between the anopheline carrier, A. culicifacies, and
irrigation water. Their evidence showed that malaria became widespread only after
the irrigation system was opened. It was concluded that "the malaria in Pattukkottai
was traceable to the effects ofthe Mettur-Cauvery irrigation system as applied to this
taluk."62 However, the relative contribution ofirrigation to the incidence of malaria
58 For a discussion on a similar experience in the Punjab, see Whitcombe, op. cit., note 5 above.
59 P. F. Russell, M. K. Menon, and T. R. Rao 'Epidemiology ofMalaria in Pattukkottai Taluk, Tanjore
District, Madras Presidency, India', Journal of the Malarial Institute ofIndia (hereafter IMII), 1938, 1:
285-326.
60 Ibid., p. 289.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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could not be exactly estimated.63 It was also argued that it was not irrigation per se
but "defective and untidy irrigation", and waste irrigation water in particular, that
were the sources ofmalaria.64 Absence of drainage facilities, and a lack of control
over field channels which caused a rise in the sub-soil water level, encouraged the
breeding ofA. culicifacies. As well as this, a number ofotherfactors, such as improper
maintenance ofcanal banks, defective distribution chambers etc., were also found to
be contributing to the spread of the disease.65
As a first step towards permanent preventive measures, the elimination of waste
water was recommended to the government ofMadras by the Rockefeller study team
in 1938. They suggested some action be taken immediately, for example the
installation ofwater-tight sluices, as therewas "no sluice in Pattukkottai which can be
properly controlled."66 The government agreed to experiment with this proposal.67
The method ofcultivation, especially in the rice growing areas, was recognized as
being another important factor in the spread ofmalaria. It is significant that not all
rice producing areas were malarious. Studies carried out in Bengal and the Punjab
showed varying degrees ofrelationship between rice cultivation and the prevalence of
the disease.68 In the case of the Madras Presidency itself, the greatest rice growing
areas (namely the deltaic region ofTanjore and Trichinopoly, Kistna and Godavari
districts) were not malarious.69 More specifically, within the Tanjore district there
were two regions where rice was cultivated, namely the delta and the Pattukkottai
taluk. The former was free of malaria, while the latter (from 1933) was not. This
seemingly paradoxical situation was attributed to the fact the "the numbers of
A. culicifacies present in the delta were markedly fewer than in the Pattukkottai
taluk."70 But this presented another question: why was this the case given the fact
that in both the areas rice was grown by wet cultivation? The answer was found
mainly in the different cultivation methods practised in these two regions:
The vector A. culicifacies thrived mostly in wet fallow fields and persisted in
transplanted rice fields, and disappeared from growing fields. Their disappearance
63 This was also the case in the Punjab. Whitcombe mentions the conflicts of opinions between the
irrigation engineers and the malariologists in the Punjab on the contribution ofirrigation to the spread of
malaria, see Whitcombe, op. cit., note 5 above.
64 P. F. Russell, 'Malaria due to defective and untidy irrigation: a preliminary discussion', JMII, 1938, 1:
348. C. A. Gill, from theexperiences in the Punjab province, concluded that "an appreciable increase in the
incidence of malaria is not a necessary concomitant of canal irrigation, but that canal irrigation may
become gravely prejudicial to health when it is wrongfully applied or improperly carried out". For details
see G. A. Gill, 'The relationship of canal irrigation and malaria', RMSI, 1931, 1: 421.
65 Excessive supply of water above the designed carrying capacity of the canals "causes a great deal of
mosquito breeding along canal banks, and indirectly by pools and irregular channels", also improper
delivery ofwater into aroadway orroadsideditch orinto an uncultivated field was found to form mosquito
breeding places, Russell, op. cit., note 64 above, p. 348.
66 Memorandum regardingmalariacontroldemonstration inPattukkottai town,by F. W. Knipe, Malaria
Officer, Rockefeller Foundation, in TNA GO 2000 (P.H.), 31 May 1938.
67 The expenditure for the same was met from the provision for epidemic diseases and anti-malarial
operations in the Budget for 1938-39. But we have no figure on the expenditures made. Ibid.
68 C. A. Gill, 'Rice cultivation and Malaria in the Punjab', RMSI 1935, 5: pp. 97-108.
69 K. R. Rao, op. cit., note 48 above, p. 483.
70P. F. Russell, F. W. Knipe and H. R. Rao, 'Onagricultural malariaanditscontrolwithspecial reference
to South India', IMG 1942, 77: 752.
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from growing rice fields also synchronised with the start of vigorous growth of the
plants. They disappeared fully when rice had grown taller than one foot.71
More wet fallow fields were foundeach year(usually from mid-June to lateAugust)
in the Pattukkottai taluk because it was mainly a single crop area, whereas in the delta
rice fields remained wet fallow for shorter periods since it was mainly a two crop area.
So the period between the first wetting ofthe fields and planting was much shorter in
the latter than in the former. The consequence was that although A. culicifacies was
found in rice fields and channels of the delta, the species never attained a density
comparable to that seen in Pattukkottai. The relationship between rice cultivation
and malaria depended less on seasonal factors than on the intensity ofactivity in the
field and the stage of growth. Also, farmers in the Pattukkottai taluk used to leave
unploughed and fallow fields wet for a period of2 to 3 weeks during the cultivation
process before beginning towork on the seed beds. Theeffect ofthis time lagwas very
significant in terms ofthe propagation ofthe malaria vector A. culicifacies, because the
most dangerous stage of the fallow field was when it was wet and unploughed.72
It was, therefore, essentially the "needlessly prolonged" period ofwet fallow fields,
and the single instead of the double rice crop that seemed to have made the
Pattukkottai taluk more malarious. Other factors, such as the presence ofwaste wet
lands, unprotected irrigation wells, and neglected field channels, contributed to the
spread of malaria.
The case of the Pattukkottai taluk showed clearly that without an intimate
knowledge ofthe local conditions and their connection with the development of the
disease, no effective controls could be designed. While in some areas the extension of
rice cultivation could be a preventive measure, in others it would not be so. At times,
due to economic and social factors, it was found necessary to resort to other methods
ofcontrol. Forexample, in the Pattukkottai taluk, a scheme ofintermittent irrigation
was tried out, initially on an experimental basis.73 It was essentially a method by
which water was periodically withheldjust enough to allow the surface of fields and
channels to become sufficiently dry to kill all the mosquito larvae. Three years of
experiments in Pattukkottai showed that this periodic interruption of the water
supply to the rice fields "resulted in effective control ofanopheles breeding, with no
increase in weed growth, and with little or no effect on the yield or quality ofgrain or
the weight ofstraw."74 During periods ofdaily rains such as in November, it was not
possible to dry the fields sufficiently to control mosquito breeding. But this did not
pose a problem, since the density of the vector A. culicifacies declined markedly in
October and was not found in rice fields when the crop was already more than a foot
high, i.e. by November when it was usually about half grown.
Apart from keeping down the larvae by intermittent irrigation, pyrethrum spraying
was tried out as another method ofcontrol against adult mosquitoes in a few villages
71 P. F. Russell and H. R. Rao, 'The anopheles of rice fields in south-eastern Madras', JMII, 1940, 3:
427-46.
72 Ibid.
73 P. F. Russell, F. W. Knipeand H. R. Rao, 'Ontheintermittentirrigationofricefields tocontrol malaria
in South India', JMII, 1942, 4: 321-40.
74 Ibid.
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in the Pattukkottai taluk.75 In Kesangadu itwas found that as a result ofspraying the
spleen rate fell from 68 per cent in November 1937 to 27 per cent by November 1938.
In the case of villages where pyrethrum spraying was not tried, the spleen rate
remained more or less constant. The cost ofthis method was estimated at 7 annas per
capita per annum.
The lessons learned in the Pattukkottai taluk probably represented only a minute
part of what remained to be discovered. A comparative survey of the relationship
between rice culture and malaria in other regions of the Presidency would perhaps
have enabled the government to formulate some broad guidelines and an effective
strategy to control malaria. However, despite the lack of such studies, the
Pattukkottai case alone showed clearly that preventive measures had to be location-
specific. The experience thus gained brought about a positive change ofview on what
could be done to check the spread of malaria, as Russell and his co-workers made
clear in their suggestions in 1942 to the policy makers in the colonial government: "it
is now undoubtedly a fact that for much of rural India malaria control is not only
feasible but financially profitable."76
IV
The case of malaria illustrates the many issues underlying the Government of
India's policy on the control of communicable diseases during the early decades of
this century. A study ofthe measures taken against other widely prevalent diseases,
such as cholera and smallpox would lead to similar observations. It was a lack not
only offinance, but also of a comprehensive knowledge ofthe relationship between
these diseases and local conditions that limited government initiatives against them.
The most significant lesson learnt from the limited experiments in Pattukkottai was
that expressed by Russell. But it seems to have had a very nmarginal impact on the
anti-malarial policy and programme of the Government of India in the later years.
Should this merely be attributed to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939
and the consequent pushing into the background of all public health measures,
especially after the resignation ofthe Congress ministry in October 1939? Or, should
it be seen as the result ofwartime economic policies which held welfare activities to be
unimportant within the overall structure and policy ofthecolonial state forwhom the
interests of the Indian people figured as a poor second to those of the colonial
master-Great Britain? Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that interest in
developing a national malaria policy was not revived until the early 1950s.
In post-independence India, a national malaria programme was launched in 1953.
It was funded by the central government but was administered by the state
governments. The two major strategies of the nation-wide anti-malaria programme
were indoor spraying with DDT twice annually in the appropriate seasons combined
with fortnightly surveillance, and radical treatment of all detected cases.77 This
programme had a definite effect but only for the following few years. From 75 million
71 Ibid.
76 Russell, Knipe, and Rao, op. cit., note 70 above, p. 749.
77 D. Banerji, Themakingofthe health services in India, Part Two, p. 232 (Centre ofSocial Medicine and
Community Health, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1983).
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cases in 1947, the incidence came down to 49,151 in 1961 and annual mortality was
reduced to nil.78 A state of near-eradication was reached by the early 1960s, but
thereafter the programme had little effect in controlling the resurgence of malaria.
There are two points to be taken into account here. The Pattukkottai experiment
had stressed the need foran understanding ofsocio-economic factors in thecontrol of
malaria, but following the Second World War, DDT and other residual insecticides
completely changed the basis on which such planning was done. Consequently, the
emphasis was now placed on attacking specific vectors and socio-economic factors
were ignored. The result was that, after some initial successes, the strategy failed.
There were many reasons for this, but the two most important were the growing
resistance of the parasites to the anti-malarial sprays and the fact that the control
programme was conceived in isolation to the health services in general.79
The need to integrate the malaria control and eradication programme with the rest
of the health care system was felt only much later, and, from the mid 1970s, efforts
were made to remedy this. However, it took a lot longer for the government to
recognize and give greater importance to the role of socio-economic factors in
improving the overall level of health among the population.
78 Ibid., p. 238.
79 N. P. Sinha, 'Malaria eradication: what went wrong?', Economic andPolitical Weekly (June 26, 1976),
pp. 946-7.
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